The result? Exactly what you’d expect. Nick Gillespie at Reason excoriates the waste of taxpayer money. As for me, I’d rather see tax money going here—where we can all get a laugh at the IRS’s expense—than see it spent on bombs or drones.
The result? Exactly what you’d expect. Nick Gillespie at Reason excoriates the waste of taxpayer money. As for me, I’d rather see tax money going here—where we can all get a laugh at the IRS’s expense—than see it spent on bombs or drones.
Today, my Facebook feed is all gay marriage, all the time. But while college kids sanctify their progressiveness by uploading pictures of equal signs, it looks like the Supreme Court is treating the issue with a little more skepticism.
Justice Alito (“the Burkean justice“) asks, “You want us to step in and render a decision based on an assessment of the effects of this institution which is newer than cell phones or the Internet? I mean . . . we do not have the ability to see the future.” It looks like some of the others are at least open to throwing the case out for lack of standing. (Ironically, such a “setback” would only happen because the petulant Governor Brown refused to defend Prop. 8 in court!) Dismissing for standing would leave the lower court ruling against Prop. 8 in place, but would stop short of imposing the Court’s definition of marriage on the rest of the country.
The New York Times‘ Adam Liptak writes that the justices are partially motivated by fear of creating a new Roe v. Wade, which, rather than settling cultural disputes, only exacerbates them. According to Liptak, even Justice Ginsburg has her qualms:
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a liberal and a champion of women’s rights, has long harbored doubts about the ruling.
“It’s not that the judgment was wrong, but it moved too far, too fast,” she said last year at Columbia Law School.
I have no basis to predict how a pro-gay-marriage ruling would compare to Roe. And predicting rulings on controversial cases is generally a loser’s game. Months from now, all of today’s armchair speculation might look incredibly naive.
But, at the very least, it’s nice to see the justices expressing a little more skepticism against pushing the entire country in their preferred cultural direction. Why, after all, do Alabama and California need to have the same marriage laws? And why should Anthony Kennedy be the one to decide that?
As a libertarian from Massachusetts—an opponent of aggressive war and a supporter of peaceful secession—I take a kind of ambivalent view of my state’s history. I certainly support the South’s right to secede from the Union and condemn the brutality that northern troops inflicted . . . but it’s still hard to side with people who found slavery morally acceptable. The standard line that “the South was wrong about slavery but right about everything else” is a little weak. Being wrong about slavery is to make a pretty huge mistake. It isn’t quite the same as being wrong about mandatory seat belt laws. Even though Massachusetts tends to always side with the statists, at least it didn’t make that mistake.
So I’m very excited to see this new movie (with a screenplay by Bill Kauffman, no less!) about Yankee opposition to the Civil War.
At least in the book version, the hero of the story is not an abolitionist. Still, it’s nice to see a portrayal of the Civil War that admits that other people wanted peace besides slaveholding southerners. There’s a whole forgotten tradition of Yankee libertarianism—perhaps best exemplified by the abolitionist Boston lawyer Lysander Spooner—that supported both the right to secede and the slaves’ rights to emancipation. After all, both derive from the uniquely libertarian right to private property.
Some spokesmen for a group called “Young Conservatives for the Freedom to Marry” have an op-ed in The Daily Caller making the libertarian case for gay marriage. They write:
As conservatives and libertarians, the three of us believe that we’d all be better served if government extricated itself from the business of marriage altogether, leaving it as a private contractual matter. Government is already big and intrusive enough, and too invested in telling ordinary Americans what is right and wrong. And as Senator Rand Paul said last week, getting government out of marriage would also take away the time-worn opposition talking point about efforts to “redefine marriage.”
However, for the time being, getting the government out of marriage is not a realistic possibility, especially given the many legal issues tied to marriage today. The next best thing, then, is for the government to act equitably in its involvement in marriage, and that means allowing all committed couples the freedom to marry and to have their marriages recognized by all levels of government.
This is an argument you often see on the libertarian left. I wonder, though: is there any other issue where libertarians would say that the cure for a government entitlement is to expand and federalize it, so that it involves more people?
You would never hear a libertarian say, “I believe that we should end foreign aid. But until we end it, it’s only fair that each country gets an equal share.” Most people would realize that, far from ending foreign aid, a program of “aid equality” would just increase the demand for it.
So why is gay marriage any different? If it is “unrealistic” to imagine the government leaving the marriage business today, won’t it be even less realistic when millions more people are entitled to federal marriage benefits?
I’ve written an article for the Cornell Daily Sun‘s law student column, defending state nullification. I argue that the people of the states—and not the Supreme Court—must to be the final decider of federal law. This is quite the minority position in law school, which, for various reasons, teaches everyone to think of federal litigation as the only way to solve contested constitutional issues.
You can read it here.
During the middle of his epic filibuster last week, Rand Paul made a very unexpected reference to the 1905 Supreme Court case, Lochner v. New York. (Randy Barnett has the full transcript here.)
Lochner is a case that all law students are taught to hate. It involved a New York law that limited the amount of hours that a bake shop employee could legally work. Later revisionist scholarship has shown that the law was actually a piece self-serving special interest legislation, backed by the unions that represented established bake shop employees, who feared new immigrant competitors. The immigrant bakers tended to work long hours in order to catch up with and displace their established competitors.
But regardless, Lochner has earned the hatred of the legal mainstream because the Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the law, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected workers’ freedom to contract with their employees for whatever terms they wanted. By limiting the amount of hours they could work, New York violated the workers’ “liberty of contract.” It wasn’t until the New Deal that the so-called “Lochner era,” in which the Court would strike down these kinds of economic regulations on “liberty of contract” grounds, was actually reversed.
It is pretty impressive that Rand Paul could speak extemporaneously (and accurately) on Lochner, hours into his filibuster. Even more impressive are his references to the extremely obscure Buchanan v. Warley case: another Lochner-era decision, where the Supreme Court struck down a segregationist law prohibiting people in majority white neighborhoods from selling their homes to black buyers (and vice versa). Obviously, this law also interfered with the liberty of contract—legal scholar David Mayer believes that, if it had been allowed to stand, it could have ushered in a South Africa-style apartheid system in America.
I certainly support liberty of contract too, and I want desperately to be able to applaud the Lochner era. After all, as Paul stated, the liberty that the Supreme Court protected wasn’t just about economic freedom, narrowly defined. The justices understood it to refer to a broader liberty to live your life free of legislative interference, unless there was some overriding reason for the government to step in. (David Bernstein and David Mayer have explained this in more detail in two excellent books.) If the Court still protected individual liberty the way they did in the Lochner era, it is hard to believe that it would stand for drone bombings of American citizens. As it is, however, Lochner‘s concern for actual rights has given way to the mushy Mathews v. Eldridge case, where life, liberty, and property are just personal “interests” that can always be tossed aside without a prior hearing if the government has a good enough reason to do so. Unsurprisingly, Mathews is one of the first cases cited in the Obama administration’s notorious drone memo.
But, while the Lochner justices’ hearts were in the right place, the era is best considered a tactical mistake—kind of like YAL endorsing Ted Cruz or Murray Rothbard going hippie.
For one thing, much of the Lochner era’s advances came from overturning state—rather than federal—laws. In the short term, it is certainly nice to see obnoxious state regulations get knocked down. But in knocking them down, the Lochner Court really just transferred power from local communities to the central government, treating the federal government as the ultimate source of power.
At the time, that might not have been so bad, given that the federal government was relatively laissez-faire. But when the old laissez-faire was replaced by Hoover and FDR’s statism, the central government could only face resistance from weakened and emasculated states. By focusing on immediate gains, the Lochner justices undermined the states’ power to fight bigger threats to liberty later on.
Second, the whole premise of “rehabilitating Lochner” assumes the Supreme Court as the proper arbiter of all constitutional issues. I’ve commented before on Murray Rothbard’s anecdote about the eighteenth-century “Burgundy Circle,” which also tried to impose top-down reform and failed miserably—the Burgundy Circle is, I think, a great cautionary tale for contemporary libertarian centralists. Over-reliance on the Supreme Court places our faith in a group of people who don’t necessarily have any personal interest in promoting liberty. And even if they did, there are only nine of them, which means that small changes in personnel could lead to huge reversals of earlier gains. The Lochner era famously ended when a single justice, Owen Roberts, switched allegiance from liberty of contract to the New Deal. Even if we work as hard as we can to revive Lochner, a similar switch—our even something as banal as Clarence Thomas forgetting to look both ways before crossing the street—could prove our undoing.
Unlike Rand Paul, I can only muster at most one cheer for Lochner. The mainstream hatred for it stems mostly from an unwarranted hatred for libertarianism in general. But, as a libertarian, I see more hope in empowering individuals and local communities to check the central government than I do in convincing the central government to check itself.
My college honors thesis advisor, Donald Livingston, recently testified at the South Carolina House Judiciary Subcommittee in favor of state nullification. Tom Woods has the full text of his remarks.
Dr. Livingston is a brilliant paleo-libertarian philosopher who first got me to realize that decentralism and freedom go together. In college, I profiled him for the Young Americans for Liberty.
One South Carolina Democratic congressman complains that Dr. Livingston’s testimony “insults the institution we serve” and continues, “I fundamentally reject his vision for our country.” Of course, Livingston’s vision is about empowering local communities, not bureaucrats. I’m it sure it would threaten this congressman’s way of life. For that alone, he deserves our acclaim.
I didn’t watch the State of the Union last night. When I’m in the mood to watch a show about nothing, I just watch reruns of Seinfeld. But apparently a lot of people did watch it, because, when I logged into Facebook today, everyone was abuzz.
Abuzz about what? The president’s escalation of deadly drone strikes? The continued politicization of Sandy Hook as a pretext for more gun control? Questions about when the “mess that Obama inherited” will ever end?
If you think so, then you’ve never met the kinds of people who obsessively follow politics. For most of these people, politics is an all-consuming hobby or a career path, not an opportunity to worry about important moral questions.
So, the buzz focused on something quite different. That is: it turns out that Marco Rubio took a sip of water during his reply speech.
The news was important enough that Politico still kept as its headline well into the evening today.
The linked article begins:
Sen. Marco Rubio’s inopportune case of cotton mouth during his State of the Union response may slow his rapidly rising stock, but will likely have no little [sic?] lingering impact on his 2016 prospects, Republican operatives said Wednesday.
Well, that must be a relief for Rubio. According to one of the best-trafficked political websites, the fact that he took a sip of water during a yesterday’s speech should not impact a presidential race 3 years from now. Genius! With analysis like that, I could be writing for Politico, and would be reaching a much wider audience than I do right now.
In case you need more analysis, see also the Atlantic‘s article, “Marco Rubio’s Awkward Drink of Water: A Deconstruction.”
This seems like the time to mention how low the news media have actually fallen. But what’s the point? The Atlantic and Politico are only focusing on what their readers care about. And the fact that this is what their readers are focusing on—on Facebook and elsewhere—tells us all too much about modern political culture.
Ben writes that nullification is popular. As well it should be. But while nullification becomes more popular among the masses, it is increasingly mocked and disparaged by the elites—though not always persuasively. The nullification scholar Tom Woods noted this recently on his blog, opining, “[A]s the MSM starts to address nullification, it’s looking like nothing but seventh-grade term papers as far as the eye can see.”
(Also note that, in Woods’s link, though the linked author disparages nullification, fully 10 out of the 11 comments disagree. Talk about a class divide!)
One example that particularly brought the “class” point home for me was this video from the Colbert Report.
Colbert’s guest is a partner at the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom—famous among law students for literally working a young attorney to death. But while the trendy liberal twenty-somethings who watch Colbert’s show might get a few yucks from the interview, it is hard to understand how it would appeal to anyone else.
For one thing, no one likes to have acceptable opinion dictated by some smarmy big city lawyer—and of course Skadden lawyers are the smarmiest and big-citiest of all.
And then there is the way that the guest simply brushes aside Colbert’s legitimate questions. At one point, he claims that Marbury v. Madison established that only the Supreme Court gets to decide on what federal law means. This itself is a questionable historical interpretation. But Colbert responded with a different, fairly common-sense reply: “The Supreme Court said that the Supreme Court gets to say what’s constitutional. How convenient!” I’m sure this was supposed to be some sort of jab at conservative simplicity, and his guest just laughed it off.
But what’s so wrong with what Colbert said? Stephen Colbert, after all, has been making headlines denouncing big money super-PACs. So if some private corporation like State Farm Insurance claimed the right to boss everyone else around, wouldn’t Colbert be one of the first people to mock them for naked self-aggrandizement?
Finally, Colbert closes by proposing a constitutional amendment to reestablish nullification. His guest smugly replies that people can try that, but then it will just be up to the Supreme Court to decide how to interpret it. That is: try self-government if you want, but it will be up to five Harvard-graduated justices to decide if you get away with it. He adds that he can recommend a few lawyers to help them with their Supreme Court litigation—just remember, Skadden lawyers don’t come cheap!
With enemies like that, who needs friends? Is there any doubt that people out in the hinterlands who stumble upon Colbert’s show would find these statements revolting?
Everyone likes to talk about how Republicans need to appeal more to the working class. Isn’t this a good place to start? Siding with local communities against smug lawyers? With self-government against rule by shifting Court majorities? The Republicans could do a lot worse.
Tom Tancredo promised to publicly smoke pot if Colorado’s legalization initiative passed. But now, after the initiative did indeed pass, he’s backing out, supposedly because his wife and grandkids were so outraged. 
All of which brings up the question: why do Tancredo’s wife and grandkids care if he smokes pot?
More to the point: why is strident opposition to marijuana a conservative value? Most conservatives wouldn’t care if Tancredo drank a beer in public—what’s so different about pot? Aristotle argued—and lots of conservatives agree—that the key to life is moderation. Tom Tancredo is 67 and has never smoked pot before—surely one joint every 67 years is the height of moderation. At this rate, he won’t have another hit until the year 2080! So where does this total and irrevocable opposition to a harmless pastime come from?
Which brings up a second point: even if conservatives have to hate pot, why hate it so much more than other bad things?
Isn’t promise-breaking morally worse than taking a puff of marijuana? After all, if people habitually renege on their promises, society would crumble. But on the other hand, society can tolerate a relatively high degree of pot smoking. And then there’s the issue of a public figure signaling to the public that he doesn’t take his own commitments seriously. Can anyone imagine Edmund Burke or James Madison publicly promising something—even something as relatively unimportant as this—and then backing out when their wives complained?
Maybe this just goes to show that the Tancredos have a weird relationship. (As one Politico commenter crudely summed up: “Some times the snatch is better than the stash.”) But I think that the Tancredo family’s intransigence is evidence of a systemic conservative opposition to pot. (Seen in, for example, Sean Hannity’s “Christian conservative” claim* that drug legalization promotes “the moral destruction of a human soul.”) And that conservative opposition just doesn’t seem to have any substantive justification, beyond a knee-jerk support for the status quo, or some vague belief that only liberal hippies smoke pot.
* I’ve never been impressed by Sean Hannity’s intellect. But the linked video is especially cringeworthy, as Hannity repeatedly insinuates that supporting legalization means that you also support government-provided drugs andgm medical care. How he discovered that link is anyone’s guess—though his interviewee, Gary Johnson, never really disavows it.
Rod Dreher opposes Mayor Bloomberg’s New York soda ban. But, in a post at the American Conservative, Dreher is outraged that the NAACP thinks of the ban as a “civil rights issue.”
That is, the NAACP points out that the ban would disparately harm minority convenience-store owners—and to Dreher, this makes them “prostitutes” in the pocket of the Big Beverage Industry.
Now, I’m not in the habit of siding with the NAACP, but I find it impossible to share Dreher’s outrage. In fact, I think that what the NAACP is doing here is downright admirable.
One of the best political developments over the last year or so has been the rise of a group of left-wing libertarian intellectuals (often called “bleeding heart libertarians,” centered around this site). A big part of their philosophy comes from applying liberal insights to generate libertarian conclusions. For instance, in the great new book Free Market Fairness, the philosopher John Tomasi applies Rawlsian principles to support free markets, arguing that, if we really believe—as Rawls did—that societies should be judged by how well they benefit their least well-off members, then free markets are much better than the quasi-socialist welfare states that Rawls actually supported. Free markets lead to higher economic standards of living for the poor, but also—by reducing the scope of the state in the individual’s life—they allow people the ability to be themselves, to choose a meaningful life free of restrictive regulations and bureaucratization, and ultimately to foster ”a special form of self-esteem that comes when people recognize themselves as central causes of the particular lives they are living” (p. 61).
I don’t consider myself part of the libertarian left, but I do find them intellectually interesting. More importantly, by focusing on how libertarianism benefits the poor and downtrodden, they’re introducing free-market ideals to a whole group of people who might not find Ayn Rand or Murray Rothbard appealing.
And this seems to be just what the NAACP is doing.
If its true that the soda regulations disproportionately hurt relatively poor minority store owners, why not highlight that fact? For most people, it’s good evidence that there’s something wrong with the regulations. Maybe not conclusive evidence—but why give up an argument that lots of people will find appealing and that might turn them against the ban?
Just because the NAACP is made up of crazy liberals? Or because we don’t want to look all lame and politically correct? Dreher seems to believe something like that. But it would be a shame if we let dislike of liberals get in the way of promising avenues for attacking the regulatory state.
The forty-year anniversary of Roe v. Wade was on Tuesday. With all the cliched left-right posturing that the abortion controversy engendered, it is instructive to read the great conservative sociologist Robert Nisbet’s thoughts on the subject. Nisbet was one of the leading conservative intellectuals of the last century and most famously argued that the decline of traditional community was responsible for the rise of paternalistic statism.
But on abortion, he defied the left-right cliches, and took a decidedly pro-choice position:
The contemporary preoccupation with abortion has its roots in the late nineteenth century, a period of many moral preoccupations and of causes to advance them. Although abortion had been a sin in the Christian church from early on, it had taken its place with a large number of other sins. Now, however, abortion became the centerpiece of a moralistic crusade. So did a good many other matters, including alcohol, tobacco, premarital sex, masturbation, meat eating, narcotics, Sunday saloon openings, and Sunday baseball. . . Never have so many laws been passed, first by the states, then the federal government, prohibiting so many actions which for thousands of years had generally been held to fall under family authority. It can be fairly argued that the present infirm state of the family in Western society is the consequence as much of moralistic laws assertedly designed to protect individual members of the family from one evil or another as it is of anything else. Current efforts to prohibit abortion categorically and absolutely might be viewed in this light. It is not so much the “woman’s right to choose” that is being assaulted as it is the ethic of family and its legitimate domain.
Nisbet attacks Roe v. Wade as the centralized government interfering with local communities, but continues:
[In the abortion crusades, on both sides, f]orces of total good are arrayed against total evil, the sure sign of a dogma encased in the struggle for absolute power. . . . But repugnant as this whole spectacle is, it does not present the danger to the social fabric and to individual liberty that is posed by the ranks of the aggressive antiabortionists. In denying the right of the woman or her family to terminate pregnancy, these soldiers of righteousness strike at the very heart of both family and individual rights.
Lots of people, including people on this blog, distinguish between “libertarianism” and “libertinism.” The former, they say, can be okay, as long as it is undergirded by conservative principles. The latter, however, is almost always denounced.
So it was a refreshing change of pace when I came across this interview with Thaddeus Russell, a libertarianish author who recently published a book defending (among others) prostitutes, hard-drinkers, juvenile delinquents, gangsters, rowdy immigrants, and the gay counterculture as fundamental to freedom. I’m a little skeptical of his argument—at the very least, I think it is a bit more productive, from the perspective of promoting liberty, to try to understand boring, bourgeois economic law than it is to celebrate dancing (which Russell does around the 4:30 mark).
But Russell’s perspective is a unique and interesting one. At least, it may indicate that the frequent condemnations of “libertinism” are overstated. After all, if the libertines aren’t hurting anyone, and if they accept a libertarian political philosophy, then what good does it do to condemn them?
In his defense of conservatism and radical change (below), Edmund Babbitt writes:
[C]onservatism is cautious about attempts to reform political society and generally favors limited and incremental rather than drastic and immediate change. . . Nevertheless, conservatives recognize that uneasiness about change does not translate into adamant and unqualified opposition to all attempts at improvement—even radical ones. . . .
In order to avoid the assumption that the present period possesses a monopoly on wisdom, conservatism tries to consider all the evidence presented by human history. As a result, conservatives may reject a significant trend which has developed in a given political society over years and decades as inconsistent with the concrete evidence found throughout the vast experience of history. Thus, the demand for a significant change is not necessarily inconsistent with conservatism. It may be conservative to reject a major development within a tradition and it may be profoundly anti-conservative to support the status quo. The ultimate determination of whether an action is conservative depends on the basis for accepting or rejecting a policy and not on whether the acceptance or rejection constitutes opposition to or support for change. (Emphasis added.)
This seems like an uncontroversial definition of conservatism. Still, all it really amounts to is the claim that conservatives are cautious and skeptical about sweeping change, and will evaluate each proposed change rationally and on its merits.
But, who doesn’t believe that? No one really supports immoderate, ill-thought-out change just for its own sake. You can be a radical rationalist and also believe that you should proceed cautiously in practical affairs. For instance, the medieval Scholastics were steeped in their own tradition and come across as humble, moderate folk. But the meat of their philosophy was based on rational deduction from self-evident facts of nature, and had nothing to do with what we would today call “conservatism.”
At best, then, it seems that conservatism is a warning bell, telling us to think twice before we try something new. But if that is true, then I see no reason to accept “conservatism” as a philosophy in the first place. You could just be a careful communist or a cautious libertarian, or whatever else. That is, you can keep the rationalist substance of your philosophy and just adopt the conservatives’ spirit of not going overboard.
When Ted Cruz ran for the Senate, he got the endorsements of Ron and Rand Paul and the Paul-inspired Young Americans for Liberty.
Compared to Ron Paul, Secretary of Defense nominee Chuck Hagel’s foreign policy is a pretty boring, if sensible enough, centrism.
But now, in a USA Today op-ed, Senator Cruz denounces Hagel’s foreign policy as “out of the mainstream” and states that “I expect to oppose his nomination for several reasons.”
What are these reasons?
For one, Hagel “views Israel not as our friend but as a nuisance.” The only evidence that Cruz offers to support this claim is that Hagel “refused to sign a letter urging the president to express solidarity with Israel and condemn the Palestinian campaign of violence.” The horror! In Cruz’s eyes, Hagel committed the cardinal sin of believing that Palestinians may have legitimate grievances and that an age-old cultural can’t be boiled down in terms of good and evil.
Just as bad, according to Cruz, Hagel opposes classifying a branch of the Iranian military as a terrorist organization and—you better sit down for this one—”has advocated direct, comprehensive negotiations with Iran’s government, along with Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria.”
Cruz then churns out some Bush-era boilerplate: “Iran is rapidly pursuing nuclear weapons capacity. The surest way to avoid military conflict is to have a strong and credible defense; weakness and appeasement only invite military aggression.”
Even if we assume (however improbably) that a poor backwater like Iran could ever pose a serious threat of “military aggression,” I’ve seen no reason to believe that Chuck Hagel would oppose a “strong and credible defense” against it.
“Defense” is defined as “resistance against attack; protection.” It does not mean sanctions, provocations, or threats of war against other countries, all of which better fit the definition of “aggression.” These kinds of acts, which Cruz apparently supports, are not resistance against some external force; they are the very aggressive, external force that he denounces.
Cruz aptly ends his op-ed by writing: “We can and should do better.” To which I can only add: listen up, Young Americans for Liberty! If Cruz opposes Hagel this much, what would he do if a real, Ron Paul-style anti-interventionist came forward? We don’t gain anything from having another war hawk in the Senate, even if he is good on economic policy.
The American Conservative just published an anti-gun article by Zach Beauchamp of Think Progress (!). Throughout the article, Beauchamp keeps repeating the figure of “32,000 deaths from gun violence per year.” I guess this is supposed to shock the reader—it certainly seems like a big number. But it would be nice to know how this number compares to years, say, in the 1990s, when there was an assault weapons ban in effect.
For those wanting some context, the Department of Justice’s own Bureau of Justice Statistics (hardly a bunch of partisan gun nuts) publishes data on historic violent crime trends. Granted, their data don’t say anything about gun crimes versus non-gun violent crimes. But they do show that, contrary to Beauchamp’s implications, the murder rate has remained constant through high and low gun-control years.
Perhaps most importantly, they also show that, though the anti-gun Left likes to talk about modern America as if it were the Wild West, your actual likelihood of being the victim of any violent crime is much lower now than it ever has been before. The FBI reports that the decrease in violent crime has only continued since the BJS survey ended. NBC News covered that story earlier this year. (Whether they’re likely to bring it up again after Sandy Hook, however, is anyone’s guess.)
None of this is conclusive evidence against gun control—the anti-gun people could still say that crime would be even lower with more control. But it gives us at least one more reason to believe that crime can be effectively reduced without gun control.
Bureau of Justice Statistics survey:
| Total violent crime |
Aggravated assault | Simple assault |
|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Murder | Rape | Robbery | ||||
| 1973 | 47.7 | 0.1 | 2.5 | 6.7 | 12.5 | 25.9 | |
| 1974 | 48.0 | 0.1 | 2.6 | 7.2 | 12.9 | 25.3 | |
| 1975 | 48.4 | 0.1 | 2.4 | 6.8 | 11.9 | 27.2 | |
| 1976 | 48.0 | 0.1 | 2.2 | 6.5 | 12.2 | 27.0 | |
| 1977 | 50.4 | 0.1 | 2.3 | 6.2 | 12.4 | 29.4 | |
| 1978 | 50.6 | 0.1 | 2.6 | 5.9 | 12.0 | 30.0 | |
| 1979 | 51.7 | 0.1 | 2.8 | 6.3 | 12.3 | 30.3 | |
| 1980 | 49.4 | 0.1 | 2.5 | 6.6 | 11.4 | 28.8 | |
| 1981 | 52.3 | 0.1 | 2.5 | 7.4 | 12.0 | 30.3 | |
| 1982 | 50.7 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 7.1 | 11.5 | 29.8 | |
| 1983 | 46.5 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 6.0 | 9.9 | 28.3 | |
| 1984 | 46.4 | 0.1 | 2.5 | 5.8 | 10.8 | 27.2 | |
| 1985 | 45.2 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 5.1 | 10.3 | 27.9 | |
| 1986 | 42.0 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 5.1 | 9.8 | 25.3 | |
| 1987 | 44.0 | 0.1 | 2.0 | 5.3 | 10.0 | 26.7 | |
| 1988 | 44.1 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 5.3 | 10.8 | 26.3 | |
| 1989 | 43.3 | 0.1 | 1.8 | 5.4 | 10.3 | 25.8 | |
| 1990 | 44.1 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 5.7 | 9.8 | 26.9 | |
| 1991 | 48.8 | 0.1 | 2.2 | 5.9 | 9.9 | 30.6 | |
| 1992 | 47.9 | 0.1 | 1.8 | 6.1 | 11.1 | 28.9 | |
| 1993 | 49.1 | 0.1 | 1.6 | 6.0 | 12.0 | 29.4 | |
| 1994 | 51.2 | 0.1 | 1.4 | 6.3 | 11.9 | 31.5 | |
| 1995 | 46.1 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 5.4 | 9.5 | 29.9 | |
| 1996 | 41.6 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 5.2 | 8.8 | 26.6 | |
| 1997 | 38.8 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 24.9 | |
| 1998 | 36.0 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 4.0 | 7.5 | 23.5 | |
| 1999 | 32.1 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 3.6 | 6.7 | 20.8 | |
| 2000 | 27.4 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 3.2 | 5.7 | 17.8 | |
| 2001 | 24.7 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.8 | 5.3 | 15.9 | |
| 2002 | 22.8 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 4.3 | 15.5 | |
| 2003 | 22.3 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 2.5 | 4.6 | 14.6 | |
| 2004 | 21.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 2.1 | 4.3 | 14.2 | |
| 2005 | 21.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 2.6 | 4.3 | 13.5 | |
| 2006a | |||||||
| 2007 | 20.4 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.4 | 3.4 | 13.9 | |
| 2008 | 19.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 2.2 | 3.3 | 12.9 | |
| 2009 | 16.9 | 1.1b | 0.3 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 11.3 | |
——–
To the best of my knowledge, the weird 2009 change in the murder rate comes from using a different reporting method. (See here, p. 2.)
Here are the FBI data:
Of all the silly abstractions that politicians conjure up, I think that the idea of a “national conversation” is one of the worst. Nations cannot converse; only individual people can. And in the society that we live in, the individual people who will have the media access to lead a national conversation are not the kinds of thoughtful people that we should be looking to for solutions to things like gun violence in the first place. Talking about “national conversations” might make us feel like mature and rational grown ups, but the form that these conversations actually take will invariably be quite immature and irrational.
Ross Douthat, in today’s New York Times, makes this point pretty effectively:
The leading gun control chorister was Michael Bloomberg, and this was fitting, because on a range of issues New York’s mayor has become the de facto spokesman for the self-consciously centrist liberalism of the Acela Corridor elite. Like so many members of that class, Bloomberg combines immense talent with immense provincialism: his view of American politics is basically the famous New Yorker cover showing Manhattan’s West Side overshadowing the world, and his bedrock assumption is that the liberal paternalism with which New York is governed can and should be a model for the nation as a whole.
It’s an assumption that cries out to be challenged by a thoughtful center-right. . . .
But instead of a kind of skepticism and sifting from conservatives, after a week of liberal self-righteousness the spotlight passed instead to … Wayne LaPierre. And no Stephen Colbert parody of conservatism could match the National Rifle Association spokesman’s performance on Friday morning. . . .
Unfortunately for our country, the Bloomberg versus LaPierre contrast is basically all of American politics today. Our society is divided between an ascendant center-left that’s far too confident in its own rigor and righteousness and a conservatism that’s marched into an ideological cul-de-sac and is currently battering its head against the wall.
The entire Obama era has been shaped by this conflict, and not for the good. On issue after issue, debate after debate, there is a near-unified establishment view of what the government should do, and then a furious right-wing reaction to this consensus that offers no real policy alternative at all.
On a similar note, law professor Dave Hoffman argues that “national conversations” themselves actually undermine self-rule:
If a community in, say, Connecticut wanted to ban assault weapon clips (because it made them feel safer – let’s put to one side data on efficacy!), Glenn Reynolds would lead a charge against the liberal fascists. Indeed. Heh. Yes. If a community in Tennessee wants to arm its teachers (because it makes them feel safer – let’s put to one side data on efficacy!) Josh Marshall and Andrew Sullivan would call them out as conservative fascists. Or loonies. Or winners of the Moore award. And we’d all get to pat ourselves on the back, but no one would actually get the benefit that law is supposed to provide, which is the helpful illusion that we’re more civilized than we actually are, and that we’re actually doing something to push back against the tide.
That is: a national conversation about guns and violence, facilitated and sped up by the internet, reduces our ability to try out different versions of the good life, and thus diminishes our capacity live together in peace.
I think this is right, though I tend to believe that the Internet mitigates, rather than aggravates, the problem. At least, thanks to the Internet, we can seek out thoughtful commentators like, say, Eugene Volokh on gun control if we really want to. Good luck finding someone of that caliber on MSNBC, Fox, or any of the other major news outlets. (The New York Times should be commended for hiring high-quality writers like Ross Douthat and, yes, Paul Krugman, but most other news outlets do not.)
Ultimately, I think the problem won’t be solved until conversations are really denationalized. I don’t know how we’ll get there, but we will know we’ve reached the goal when people have the same reaction to the idea of a “national conversation” that they would have today to the idea of a “hemispherical conversation.” The idea that problems should be discussed and solved on a national level not only undermines individual liberty and self-rule (by shifting power from individuals and authentic communities to the national government), but also virtually guarantees that the conversations we do get will be the kinds of conversations that aren’t worth having.