Like Harlots on a Piano

Today we are featuring a guest post from Wm. Samuel Bradford, who runs The Method Reader, where he examines the line between reality and fiction.

Disclaimer: What follows is a critique of feminism. I’m aware that getting a white guy to maneuver the intricacies of oppression is like one of those blind cave newts trying to cross a highway. Nonetheless, my goal is an impartial, balanced account, with all bloviations pierced and deflated, all privileges checked at the door. The last thing I want is to resemble recent Republican commentary on the issue of women’s rights, reminiscent of a pileup on the freeway. The force of impact from a chain reaction of bizarrely inaccurate remarks on the subjects of rape and basic anatomy results in near-fatal insertions of foot into mouth such that Q-tips have been issued to undergraduate political interns for the gentle swabbing of toe jam out of synaptic pathways.

The following story is true. I changed the names, and despite the inevitable interpolation in recalling decade-old dialogue, the gist is still there.

My first two semesters of college, I took Dr. M’s 17th and 20th century French literature courses. Twice a week the rest of the students and I sat around a Harkness table and fumbled through conversations in a language we didn’t know that well about a book we didn’t understand (or read to begin with). The perfunctory fumbling petered out after about twenty minutes, and the rest of the hour was mercifully filled by Dr. M, who, with impeccable French spoken in a long, unapologetic middle-Georgia accent, parsed the tenets of Cartesianism from a photo of one of Louis XIV’s chairs.

When Dr. M was awarded a research grant, he chose me from a pool of applicants for a research assistant position (my only distinguishing credentials included the ability to stay awake in class and once recognizing Irene Papas from a clip of Iphigenia). Dr. M. had dedicated thirty years of his life to the Mélusine manuscripts of Jean D’Arras, which is a medieval legend about a French fairy woman who could turn into a dragon. My mother, who wanted me to be a dentist, later bought me a butterfly net so that I could “go catch medieval fairies in the woods with Dr. M” as part of my “research” (her implied quotation marks).

He had already done the grunt-work: trips to French monasteries, bargaining with librarians, amassing a small mountain of microfilm slides printed from photocopied manuscripts. He had a draft of his book, which was to be a critical bilingual edition of the legend. The problem was that the printed microfilm photos of the manuscript were too small to decipher. He had a system of arranging two magnifying glasses in front of the paper in order to proofread his transcriptions. We had to be careful not to work in direct sunlight, for fear of fire. He wanted me to align the magnifying glasses while he read.

You should have seen his face when I brought him a poster-sized copy of a manuscript page from the Xerox machine. His eyes looked like they still had the magnifying glasses in front of them. So after a couple of hours in the copy room I was able to save him a few months of eye-strain. For my efforts, I was given two things: 1) a shout-out in the acknowledgements: “For his valuable assistance in solving problems related to manuscript access, I wish to express sincere thanks to my research assistant, William S. Bradford” and 2) a level of trust that granted the opportunity for completely open discussion.

I remember discussing Hinduism, Lorca, Cervantes, his time serving in Vietnam, the pettiness of academia. He told me how he met his wife. He got me into Proust, and I remember him reading this long passage where Proust chronicles the hues of ripening asparagus for the entirety of a page.

“You see how it matters?” he said. “It all matters with Proust. Everything is important.”

I had a vision of the purple-green asparagus with a scintillating halo of St. Elmo’s fire. Everything was important. That page was a challenge to the reader – an aesthetic rebellion. Admittedly, it’s not hard to blow the mind of a nineteen-year-old. My reaction was something like this:

asparagusproust

The semester ended, and we stayed on good terms. Every once in a while we met up for supper.

My senior year of college I briefly dated (three months) a girl — let’s call her Genevieve — who was a triple major in psychology, religion, and women’s studies. I’m pretty sure she ended up graduating summa cum laude, but I don’t know because we graduated at different times. She was also a feminist, and not the everyone-should-care-about-equality garden variety, but more the symposium-attending-Vagina-Monolouging -may-or-may-not-have-held-up-a-banner-on-the-steps-of-the-capitol variety.

“So what are you doing tonight?” she asked me one evening. This was early in the relationship, the part where you are respectful of the other person’s freedom, but already affecting it by virtue of the Observer Principle.

“I’m going to dinner with Dr. M.”

“The French professor?”

“Yeah. Did you have him?”

“Ugh. Yes.” I am in no way trying to belittle this woman, even though this is the weird situation of describing a former liaison. Keep in mind that she won a scholarship, had written a novel while in high school, and now speaks, I’m pretty sure, a few different languages. All that aside, however, I think I remember her making the “gag me” face when I mentioned Dr. M’s name.

“Why don’t you like him?”

“He made the most sexist remark that I’ve ever heard.”

I couldn’t imagine him saying anything insensitive. The man was sensitive enough to induce epiphanies from asparagus.

“Gosh. What did he say?”

“You know how he always made us speak French in his class?”

“Yeah.”

“Well I was trying to answer his question once, and he cut me off in the middle of my answer. He told me I was too timid. That I needed to be bold with French.”

“And that’s sexist because he’s presuming that you’re timid —”

“No, Sam. C’mon. I haven’t gotten to the sexist part yet: he told me that I needed to elocute like harlots on a piano.”

“Harlots? As in, like, two of them?”

“Yup. On a piano.”

“Wow. That’s quite an image.” I imagined some sweaty, gap-toothed saloon girl sprawled across the top of an upright. “He never talked to me like that.”

“Well, you’re a guy.”

“Yeah, I guess that is pretty sexist.”

“You guess? It’s horrific.”

“So what’d you do?”

“I wrote about it on the course evaluation, but naturally the professors never read those, so I took it to Dr. O’Brien-Stuart.” Dr. Pamela O’Brien-Stuart. That’s not her real name, but I want you to know that I’m not taking a cheap-shot; her initials really are P.O.S. Anyway, she’s a professor in the women’s studies department, and would later serve on Genevieve’s thesis committee.

“What’d you say to her?” I asked.

“I told her what he said.”

“What’d she do?”

“I don’t know. She took it seriously. She’s on a lot of committees and everything.”

“I had no idea Dr. M said things like that.”

“Well, he does. So enjoy your dinner with him.”

At dinner that night, we entered the familiar and lovely trance of jumping from esoteric idea to esoteric idea. We measured out the time in bathroom breaks from all the post-dessert coffee. Dr. M was in rare form – his book, the culmination of his career, was very well received in France. He glowed like asparagus.

But I still couldn’t shake the image of the harlots.

“I started dating a girl,” I told him. “I think she’s a former student of yours.”

“Who is she?”

I told him. He squinted at the ceiling, and after a moment, started to chuckle to himself silently.

“What is it?”

“I remember her. She wrote the most curious thing on my course evaluation.”

“Did she?”

“She said I told her to elocute like harlots on a piano!”

“You didn’t?

“Why, no, Guillaume. That’s the funniest thing I ever heard. I told her to have confidence – elocute like Horowitz on the piano.”

Vladimir Horowitz, the pianist bruited for his bold, percussive interpretations of Chopin.

Dr. M’s southern accent was so impressive, Horowitz glissandoed into Harlots.

We laughed.

“I hope you two are happy together,” he said, thumbing a chuckle-induced tear from his eye.

This kind of sentence makes for bad writing, but the truth of it is so rumbling and pervasive that I cannot strike it: I sighed in great relief.

“And how are you doing?” I asked.

“Well, Guillaume, I have to tell you. I’m not returning to school in the fall.”

“What? Why?”

“My performance was up for review, and they didn’t grant me tenure.”

“I can’t believe it! But, your book! People like it!”

“It is what it is. I’m too old to keep fighting for it, so I’m retiring early.”

He picked up the tab while I was in shock. The consummate genteel liberal arts scholar. What about fairies? What about asparagus?

Dr. P.O.S. carries a lot of weight on the faculty. Now, I’m not saying that Genevieve’s complaint is what caused Dr. M’s tenure to be declined, but I am saying that it certainly couldn’t have helped things. I’m also not saying that this whole thing is what caused our breakup not too much later, but I am saying that it certainly couldn’t have helped things.

Wordsworth has that line in Tintern Abbey that gets at what I’m trying to get at: “of all that we behold/ From this green earth; of all the mighty world /Of eye and ear,–both what they half create,/ And what perceive.”

Perception is not just perception. We half-perceive and half-create.

I’ve done it. When I was writing my thesis on Old English riddles, I could walk down the street and gurgle out tomes describing how every fluttering pigeon, every piece of trash, every “eat more chicken” advertisement related directly to this one particular manuscript from ten-and-a-half centuries ago. Foaming with zeal, I wondered how no one else could see the connection. Graduate school is a unique form of madness.

Just consider what’s wrong in half-creating something that has the potential to condemn. My wife keeps up with the feminist blogosphere, and her segue into that portion of our conversation, which has become a running joke between us, is always “And the feminists are outraged again.” I want to suggest that pointing out the good must play more of a role because Wordsworth leaves room for the opposite to be true as well: look for good, and you will half-create it.

As a teacher, I do that all the time. If a student is off-task, I act aloof and comment on something good that the kid is doing. If I continually point out an error, the kid will start to identify him/herself with being the bad kid, which is only a stone’s throw (and just consider who’s throwing the first stone) from not caring that he/she is a bad kid. I want the students to associate themselves with being well-behaved and thoughtful. In most cases, the student will feel guilty and auto-correct the bad behavior, because now bad behavior is not part of who he/she is. I’d like to see more of that in feminist rhetoric. Perhaps, for example, there could be a blog that chronicles exemplary instances of people not being sexist. If that sounds like a toothless approach, you have to ask yourself: are you seeing something, or are you seeing what’s been on your mind a while?

I’m worried that people will read this and their faces will tug into smug smiles and they’ll say “oh, those crazy feminists!” and dismiss it. Don’t do that. If you think about it, this is not just a critique of feminism; it’s a critique of the general mindset of politics. Republicans and Democrats fall into this same Wordsworth Romantic Idealist trap[1]. If anything, they want to up the percentages on the half-create side. Take this example, where one side hears “It takes a village to raise a child” while the other side hears “The villagers are going to take your child away from you and raise it.”

I can forgive Genevieve’s blunder because she was unaware of what she was doing. In that case, a conversation, a blog post, or an ecumenical David Foster Wallace Youtube video about awareness can improve things. In fact, I did explain the whole situation to Genevieve the next day, and she was stunned into silence (whether her conscience was pricked enough to attempt fixing her error — or at least apologize — is another story on which I don’t have the details). At the very least, she became aware. But what is moderately frightening is when the Wordsworth Phenomenon becomes a deliberate political tactic: it behooves the party to purposefully misconstrue a statement in the way that is as detrimental as possible to the other party because a certain percentage of people will take what you say at face value no matter what. This becomes a higher priority than critical reasoning. Cut your losses with the few followers who take context into consideration and are subsequently appalled by you.

The universal complaint regarding politics is that one side never listens to the other side, right? On the contrary, it ironically requires an almost monastic level of devotion to the other side in order to make such a calculated miscalculation. Take the Republican pronoun-antecedent obliteration of context in Obama’s “You didn’t build that” speech as an example (that = the business owner’s business vs. that = the roads and bridges). Targeting such an innocuous phrase is like plucking a fly from the air with a pair of tweezers. The Republican response was not an innocent grammar error, and no remedial lesson in pronouns is going to stop that kind of thing from happening.

Look, feminism isn’t to blame. Sexism is there. It’s real, and it’s a huge problem that needs a lot of attention. I’m not denying that. But a concern I have is that passions can become hallucinations, and the greater concern: political parties exploit that potential. And if that’s the case, Proust’s asparagus is reduced to a phallic symbol. Horowitz becomes at least two harlots.


[1] Wordsworth was not the first to forge this idea. Between laudanum hits, he and Coleridge read a lot of German idealist philosophy, including Schopenhauer and Schelling.

Categories: Feminism, Uncategorized | 5 Comments

In Defense of “Wives, Mothers, and Daughters”

In case you missed it, certain feminist quarters have, in recent months, taken the Obama administration to task for his tendency to refer to women as “our wives, mothers, and daughters” in policy speeches. Back in February, a petition on the White House’s “We the People” page protested the President using similar language in his State of the Union speech. The feminist blogosphere has since been in a bit of a remarkably prolonged state of fury over what they perceive as a tendency to only value women in direct correlation to their relationship to men. One blogger recently equated talking about women in this more relational sense with “perpetuating rape culture by advancing the idea that a woman is only valuable in so much as she is loved or valued by a man.”

Now, all of this uproar over a relatively innocuous turn of phrase, (innocuous compared to, say, drone strikes against innocent women in Yemen and Pakistan), might seem a bit overblown. Far be it from me to wander unwittingly into the linguistic hinterland that is home to the contemporary gender-equality movement. However, behind all of this debate over the President’s language, I think something much more profound- and troubling- is taking place here.

What is really being objected to is not so much the President’s choice of words but a particular understanding of human nature. The current culturally-prevalent view of human nature rests on an anthropological assumption that posits womankind as consisting, ultimately, of atomized female  individuals with no inherent social or familial obligations to any other individuals (male or female). Speaking generously, one could perhaps attribute this individualistic view of human nature to a misguided affirmation of the undeniable value of each individual man or woman. But to the extent that this modern anthropology advances each woman’s individual identity as an alternative to the preponderance of social/familial identities that traditionally have held sway over both genders, one can easily expect those (quite legitimate) relational identities to be seen as a threat to a woman’s true worth, which proponents of this view argue is internal and non-relational. In other words, to the extent that women see their relationships with other individuals (or with the Divine) as an integral part of their being, their status as women is somehow suspect. Melissa McEwan, who started the We the People petition against Obama’s “wives, mothers, and daughters” language, did so because she took exception to any expression of femininity that “defines women by their relationships to other people.”

The problem with all of this is that society cannot long remain functional once its members (both male and female) reject their traditional obligations to one another. The foreseeable social consequences of such a radical break in human self-understanding sound all too familiar today:

-          an increase in divorce and abortion rates

-          an increase in the number of children born out-of-wedlock or raised in single-parent households

-          an increasing, culturally-pervasive materialism that attempts to fill relational voids with physical possessions

-          an increase in interpersonal egocentrism that sees other people as mere tools to be used for one’s own gratification

-          a decreasing amount of mutual respect among relationships (particularly inter-gender relationships) of all forms

If these indications of social disintegration sound familiar to the modern ear, it is because of the enormous extent to which modern American society (with considerable help from the welfare state) has successfully stripped modern men of those relationships- as husbands, fathers , brothers, etc.- that historically have given male life meaning. Mary Elizabeth Williams of Salon references as much when she writes that  “women are still living in a world where we, unlike our male counterparts, are defined by our relationships to others.”

From a relational and familial standpoint, American society today seems to be on the verge of going completely off the rails, if it hasn’t already. To the extent that proponents of gender-equality are troubled by the perceived increase in destructive behavior patterns among American males (especially in regard to their relationships with women), they recognize this problem. To then present women in an individualistic manner- particularly to the exclusion of the relational components of human nature- is not only to deprive each female life of a significant source of meaning, but to exacerbate their own social disintegration.

Categories: Atomism, Cultural renewal, Feminism | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 15 Comments

The IRS Makes a Star Trek Parody

The result? Exactly what you’d expect. Nick Gillespie at Reason excoriates the waste of taxpayer money. As for me, I’d rather see tax money going here—where we can all get a laugh at the IRS’s expense—than see it spent on bombs or drones.

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A Little Supreme Court Skepticism?

Today, my Facebook feed is all gay marriage, all the time. But while college kids sanctify their progressiveness by uploading pictures of equal signs, it looks like the Supreme Court is treating the issue with a little more skepticism.

Justice Alito (“the Burkean justice“) asks, “You want us to step in and render a decision based on an assessment of the effects of this institution which is newer than cell phones or the Internet? I mean . . . we do not have the ability to see the future.” It looks like some of the others are at least open to throwing the case out for lack of standing. (Ironically, such a “setback” would only happen because the petulant Governor Brown refused to defend Prop. 8 in court!) Dismissing for standing would leave the lower court ruling against Prop. 8 in place, but would stop short of imposing the Court’s definition of marriage on the rest of the country.

The New York TimesAdam Liptak writes that the justices are partially motivated by fear of creating a new Roe v. Wade, which, rather than settling cultural disputes, only exacerbates them. According to Liptak, even Justice Ginsburg has her qualms:

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a liberal and a champion of women’s rights, has long harbored doubts about the ruling.

“It’s not that the judgment was wrong, but it moved too far, too fast,” she said last year at Columbia Law School.

I have no basis to predict how a pro-gay-marriage ruling would compare to Roe. And predicting rulings on controversial cases is generally a loser’s game. Months from now, all of today’s armchair speculation might look incredibly naive.

But, at the very least, it’s nice to see the justices expressing a little more skepticism against pushing the entire country in their preferred cultural direction. Why, after all, do Alabama and California need to have the same marriage laws? And why should Anthony Kennedy be the one to decide that?

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The Rise of the “Post-Movement Conservatives”

At the The American Conservative, Maisie Allison profiles a number of conservative public intellectuals who defy not only the Republican Party, but also the all-too-stale “conservative movement.” This loosely related group of individuals is dubbed “post-movement conservatives.”

She opens up her piece with a reference to Peter Viereck. His thought weighs down heavily throughout the entire article, with copious quotations and excerpts from the essay of his on which I also relied for quotations, in my last post on the “challenge” that Viereck poses to contemporary conservatism and conservatives. But hers is a much better use of his work.

I think her article provides an opportunity for us at Beyond the GOP to consider where it is that we fit in with contemporary conservatism, and where it is that we want to fit. Are we a part of this post-movement conservatism? Are our potential allies that she mentions: Andrew Sullivan, David Frum, Conor Friedersdorf and other journalists, bloggers, pundits and intellectuals who neither follow the party nor the movement?

Or are those figures a part of the problem? As is specified in the article, is a “post-movement conservatism” a type of myth?

As Ben, Kelse, and others seem to suggest in their writings, for conservatism to be effective—for conservation to occur—conservatives must act radically. Conservatives cannot accept the welfare state, it cannot accept the centralization of the government, but rather there must be an intellectually sophisticated, philosophically robust and principled outlook that privileges culture, and its change, above the exercise of political power.

In that decision to prioritize cultural power above political power, I think we follow the tone set by Viereck’s “pre-political conservatism” more than the political-power-oriented conservatism of the figures who are a part of her “post-movement” group. And because of their emphasis on changing the political climate, it may be the case that those figures singled out as “post-movement conservatives” are a part of the problem. They are the conservatives who cause us at Beyond the GOP to scratch our heads and worry about their conservative bona fides. As a result, at least as the article conceives of it, “post-movement conservatism” would seem to be a myth. At the end of the day, they are just a part of that conservative movement.

Unless . . . we are part of this movement. It seems that at times we are as concerned with ideological purity as any “movement” conservative organization or media organ. Take the narrative of Judeo-Christian foundations on decline; secession; or history, tradition, and rationalism. We seem to rehash debates that occurred decades ago. We’re just a part of that stale, self-contained dialog that the “post-movement” conservatives have broken out beyond. Where do we fit in the movement/post-movement scheme?

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What Peter Viereck Can Tell Today’s Conservatives

In later editions of his bookConservatism Revisited: The Revolt Against Ideology, Peter Viereck includes a second part with the provocative title “The New Conservatism: What Went Wrong?” In his provocative post on “cool kids” conservatism, Kelse mentions Viereck fairly negatively in a discussion about just what it is that conservatism is worth. I think Viereck presents a challenge to the libertarians and the conservatives on this blog (as well as a lot of what counts as the conservative right today) in those few pages. It is relevant today, just as it was when it was first published around 40 years ago.

Here are some passages which, I think, require contemporary conservatives to face some unpleasant political realities.

(from page 134 of the Transaction edition 2005)

In America, Southern agrarianism has long been the most gifted literary manifestation of the conservatism of yearning. Its most important intellectual manifesto was the Southern Symposium I’ll Take My Stand, 1930, contrasting
the cultivated human values of a lost aristocratic agrarianism with Northern commercialism and liberal materialism. At their best, these and more recent examples of the conservatism of yearning are needed warnings against shallow practicality. The fact that such warnings often come from the losing side of our Civil War is in itself a merit; thereby they caution a nation of success-worshippers against the price of success. But at their worst, such books of the 1930s, and again of today, lack the living roots of genuine conservatism and have only lifeless ones. The lifeless ones are really a synthetic substitute for roots, contrived by romantic nostalgia.

Such romanticizing conservatives refuse to face up to the old and solid historical roots of most or much American liberalism. What is really rootless and abstract is not the increasingly conservatized New Deal liberalism but the romantic conservatives’ own utopian dream of an aristocratic agrarian restoration. Their unhistorical appeal to history, their traditionless worship of tradition, characterize the conservatism of writers like Russell Kirk.

In contrast, a genuinely rooted, history-minded conservative conserves the roots that are really there, exactly as Burke did when he conserved not only the monarchist-conservative aspects of William the Third’s bloodless revolution of 1688 but also its constitutional-liberal aspects. The latter aspects, formulated by the British philosopher John Locke, have been summarized in England and America ever since by the word “Lockean.”

And he states further (this on page 142 of the previously mentioned edition)

What about the argument (very sincerely believed by National Review and Old Guard Republicans) that denies the label “conservative” to those of us who support trade unionism and who selectively support many New Deal reforms? According to this argument, our support of such humane and revolution-preventing reforms in politics—by New Dealers and democratic socialists—makes us indistinguishable from liberals in philosophy. Shall we then cease to call ourselves philosophical conservatives, despite our conservative view of history and human nature?

So, conservatives, what is your answer to his question?

Categories: 2012, Cultural renewal, Ideology, Rand Paul, Robert Nisbet, The Constitution, Traditionalism, Tyranny | Tags: , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Northerners Against the Civil War

As a libertarian from Massachusetts—an opponent of aggressive war and a supporter of peaceful secession—I take a kind of ambivalent view of my state’s history. I certainly support the South’s right to secede from the Union and condemn the brutality that northern troops inflicted . . . but it’s still hard to side with people who found slavery morally acceptable. The standard line that “the South was wrong about slavery but right about everything else” is a little weak. Being wrong about slavery is to make a pretty huge mistake. It isn’t quite the same as being wrong about mandatory seat belt laws. Even though Massachusetts tends to always side with the statists, at least it didn’t make that mistake.

So I’m very excited to see this new movie (with a screenplay by Bill Kauffman, no less!) about Yankee opposition to the Civil War.

At least in the book version, the hero of the story is not an abolitionist. Still, it’s nice to see a portrayal of the Civil War that admits that other people wanted peace besides slaveholding southerners. There’s a whole forgotten tradition of Yankee libertarianism—perhaps best exemplified by the abolitionist Boston lawyer Lysander Spooner—that supported both the right to secede and the slaves’ rights to emancipation. After all, both derive from the uniquely libertarian right to private property.

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Libertarian Blind Spots on Gay Marriage

Some spokesmen for a group called “Young Conservatives for the Freedom to Marry” have an op-ed in The Daily Caller making the libertarian case for gay marriage. They write:

As conservatives and libertarians, the three of us believe that we’d all be better served if government extricated itself from the business of marriage altogether, leaving it as a private contractual matter. Government is already big and intrusive enough, and too invested in telling ordinary Americans what is right and wrong. And as Senator Rand Paul said last week, getting government out of marriage would also take away the time-worn opposition talking point about efforts to “redefine marriage.”

However, for the time being, getting the government out of marriage is not a realistic possibility, especially given the many legal issues tied to marriage today. The next best thing, then, is for the government to act equitably in its involvement in marriage, and that means allowing all committed couples the freedom to marry and to have their marriages recognized by all levels of government.

This is an argument you often see on the libertarian left. I wonder, though: is there any other issue where libertarians would say that the cure for a government entitlement is to expand and federalize it, so that it involves more people?

You would never hear a libertarian say, “I believe that we should end foreign aid. But until we end it, it’s only fair that each country gets an equal share.” Most people would realize that, far from ending foreign aid, a program of “aid equality” would just increase the demand for it.

So why is gay marriage any different? If it is “unrealistic” to imagine the government leaving the marriage business today, won’t it be even less realistic when millions more people are entitled to federal marriage benefits?

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Nullification Comes to Cornell

I’ve written an article for the Cornell Daily Sun‘s law student column, defending state nullification. I argue that the people of the states—and not the Supreme Court—must to be the final decider of federal law. This is quite the minority position in law school, which, for various reasons, teaches everyone to think of federal litigation as the only way to solve contested constitutional issues.

You can read it here.

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Rand Paul on Lochner

During the middle of his epic filibuster last week, Rand Paul made a very unexpected reference to the 1905 Supreme Court case, Lochner v. New York. (Randy Barnett has the full transcript here.)

Lochner is a case that all law students are taught to hate. It involved a New York law that limited the amount of hours that a bake shop employee could legally work. Later revisionist scholarship has shown that the law was actually a piece self-serving special interest legislation, backed by the unions that represented established bake shop employees, who feared new immigrant competitors. The immigrant bakers tended to work long hours in order to catch up with and displace their established competitors.

But regardless, Lochner has earned the hatred of the legal mainstream because the Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the law, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected workers’ freedom to contract with their employees for whatever terms they wanted. By limiting the amount of hours they could work, New York violated the workers’ “liberty of contract.” It wasn’t until the New Deal that the so-called “Lochner era,” in which the Court would strike down these kinds of economic regulations on “liberty of contract” grounds, was actually reversed.

It is pretty impressive that Rand Paul could speak extemporaneously (and accurately) on Lochner, hours into his filibuster. Even more impressive are his references to the extremely obscure  Buchanan v. Warley case: another Lochner-era decision, where the Supreme Court struck down a segregationist law prohibiting people in majority white neighborhoods from selling their homes to black buyers (and vice versa). Obviously, this law also interfered with the liberty of contract—legal scholar David Mayer believes that, if it had been allowed to stand, it could have ushered in a South Africa-style apartheid system in America.

I certainly support liberty of contract too, and I want desperately to be able to applaud the Lochner era. After all, as Paul stated, the liberty that the Supreme Court protected wasn’t just about economic freedom, narrowly defined. The justices understood it to refer to a broader liberty to live your life free of legislative interference, unless there was some overriding reason for the government to step in. (David Bernstein and David Mayer have explained this in more detail in two excellent books.) If the Court still protected individual liberty the way they did in the Lochner era, it is hard to believe that it would stand for drone bombings of American citizens. As it is, however, Lochner‘s concern for actual rights has given way to the mushy Mathews v. Eldridge case, where life, liberty, and property are just personal “interests” that can always be tossed aside without a prior hearing if the government has a good enough reason to do so. Unsurprisingly, Mathews is one of the first cases cited in the Obama administration’s notorious drone memo.

But, while the Lochner justices’ hearts were in the right place, the era is best considered a tactical mistake—kind of like YAL endorsing Ted Cruz or Murray Rothbard going hippie.

For one thing, much of the Lochner era’s advances came from overturning state—rather than federal—laws. In the short term, it is certainly nice to see obnoxious state regulations get knocked down. But in knocking them down, the Lochner Court really just transferred power from local communities to the central government, treating the federal government as the ultimate source of power.

At the time, that might not have been so bad, given that the federal government was relatively laissez-faire. But when the old laissez-faire was replaced by Hoover and FDR’s statism, the central government could only face resistance from weakened and emasculated states. By focusing on immediate gains, the Lochner justices undermined the states’ power to fight bigger threats to liberty later on.

Second, the whole premise of “rehabilitating Lochner” assumes the Supreme Court as the proper arbiter of all constitutional issues. I’ve commented before on Murray Rothbard’s anecdote about the eighteenth-century “Burgundy Circle,” which also tried to impose top-down reform and failed miserably—the Burgundy Circle is, I think, a great cautionary tale for contemporary libertarian centralists. Over-reliance on the Supreme Court places our faith in a group of people who don’t necessarily have any personal interest in promoting liberty. And even if they did, there are only nine of them, which means that small changes in personnel could lead to huge reversals of earlier gains. The Lochner era famously ended when a single justice, Owen Roberts, switched allegiance from liberty of contract to the New Deal. Even if we work as hard as we can to revive Lochner, a similar switch—our even something as banal as Clarence Thomas forgetting to look both ways before crossing the street—could prove our undoing.

Unlike Rand Paul, I can only muster at most one cheer for Lochner. The mainstream hatred for it stems mostly from an unwarranted hatred for libertarianism in general. But, as a libertarian, I see more hope in empowering individuals and local communities to check the central government than I do in convincing the central government to check itself.

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Rand… Randy… Oooh Yeah

As Ben, Kelse and others consider the profundity and efficacy of Rand Paul’s epic filibuster, and while I think of a response to Kelse’s awesome critical examination of my self-identified conservatism, I counsel us to take a step back to remember what’s really important:

Tell the White House to designate May 20th as Macho Man Randy Savage Day

I have seen it on facebook and I’d like our readers to be aware of this important step for American national pride, unity and occasional monarchy.

Let’s reminisce this man’s profound effect on our country

As I watched Randy Savage call out with confidence and certainty the then-World Wrestling Federation President, I immediately thought of Rand Paul’s epic filibuster: not because he’s the cream of the crop, but because Randy Savage lost to Ricky Steamboat in Wrestlemania III. That doesn’t give me confidence in a long view of the effect of Senator Paul’s action. It just makes me think that, after everything is said and done and the script is finished, he will lose. Randy Savage lost to a great technician from Hawai’i; Senator Paul will ultimately lose to a great technician from Hawai’i (perhaps with some outside interference from his allies). Just call me a pessimist.

But don’t let that stop you: work for your democracy, don’t wait for your democracy to work for you. Rand Paul is working for our democracy. So, too, can the memory of Macho Man Randy Savage.

Categories: Constitutional Law, Cultural development, Cultural renewal, Ideology, Libertarianism, Rand Paul, The Constitution, Traditionalism, Tyranny | Tags: , , , | Leave a comment

The Enigma of Rand Paul

Ben hopes that Rand Paul’s filibuster yesterday can turn civil liberties and checks and balances into bipartisan issues.

I hope so too—and I think there’s some reason for hope—but I’m still extremely skeptical. While lots of people are “standing with Rand,” the support isn’t nearly as universal as one might hope.

Among liberals, the MSNBC host Lawrence O’Donnell called the filibuster “rambling madness,” while Dave Weigel at Slate breezily writes it off as silly “paranoia.” Nancy Pelosi claims that “life is too short” to care about it—though for many future drone victims, life would be much longer if Pelosi cared a little more.

Likewise, if you read the comments sections of the various Slate and Huffington Post articles on the filibuster, you will find a shocking amount of virulently anti-Rand, pro-drone comments, presumably from regular, middle class, non-pundit voters who would have been up in arms if Bush ever claimed the right to target American citizens like Obama does. The vitriol hit a particularly horrifying note when one HuffPo commenter—jocrin—fantasized about Obama sending a drone to murder Rand Paul in the middle of his speech. Checks and balances, indeed.

And of course, the other side is nearly as bad. It is very hard to imagine people like Ted Cruz opposing drone strikes if it were a President Romney ordering them. Anyone who can remember back to last week might recall the Tea Party’s hyperbolic attacks on Chuck Hagel, for Hagel daring to suggest that the Iraq War was anything less than sunshine and roses. Lest we also forget, Rand Paul did not carry himself well through the Hagel hearings, though he ultimately did the right thing.

It’s possible to take these claims of hypocrisy too far. Many of the HuffPo commenters tend to focus myopically on such Tea Party hypocrisy—a tactic that looks a lot like a coping mechanism to avoid the uncomfortable question of whether their own president is pursuing policies that they should, consistently, oppose. Just because some people are hypocritical doesn’t mean we should oppose them when they do good things. But it does mean that we shouldn’t take what they say at face value.

Still, the powers of partisanship notwithstanding, it seems safe to say that Rand Paul has never been more popular than he is today. Principled liberals like the ACLU, Code Pink, and even Van Jones have expressed their support. Van Jones went so far as to call him a “hero.”

Maybe this will be a lesson to Rand that he can garner more support by standing against war and supporting civil liberties than from endorsing Mitt Romney or pledging war on behalf of Israel. He can never please the Obamaphile hordes who have sworn allegiance to their leader, right or wrong. But maybe he will realize that his cultural base lies more with the younger generation of antiwar civil libertarians than with the Fox News-watching septuagenarians that he has hitherto courted.

We will have to wait and see. Like all else with Rand Paul, his filibuster was an enigma.

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Donald Livingston at the South Carolina State House

My college honors thesis advisor, Donald Livingston, recently testified at the South Carolina House Judiciary Subcommittee in favor of state nullification. Tom Woods has the full text of his remarks.

Dr. Livingston is a brilliant paleo-libertarian philosopher who first got me to realize that decentralism and freedom go together. In college, I profiled him for the Young Americans for Liberty.

One South Carolina Democratic congressman complains that Dr. Livingston’s testimony “insults the institution we serve” and continues, “I fundamentally reject his vision for our country.”  Of course, Livingston’s vision is about empowering local communities, not bureaucrats. I’m it sure it would threaten this congressman’s way of life. For that alone, he deserves our acclaim.

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A Conservatism the Cool Kids Will Like

Being a conservative academic can be tough and thankless. On college campuses, all the accolades will go to the Left. When you apply for teaching positions, you have to hide your own convictions just to get the job. If you do get the job (remember that F.A. Hayek won the Nobel Prize but couldn’t get tenure at the University of Chicago), your peers won’t really respect you, or they’ll only grant you the grudging respect of an outsider who doesn’t belong. Intelligent media outlets like the New York Times and NPR will feed your colleagues an endless stream of tidbits on just how dumb people like you really are, and how superior they all are in comparison.

Given the culture we live in, it’s understandable that a lot of conservatives will start longing for the praise that their liberal friends receive, but which is always denied to them. It’s a process that anyone who’s spent any time around conservative students and academics has seen countless times. You realize that you can’t win any praise by pushing conservative ideas, so instead you push liberal ideas from a so-called conservative perspective. People like Bruce Bartlett, David Frum, and Sam Tanenhaus have turned it into an art form.

Ann Coulter recently made a lot of waves by calling libertarians “pussies” for doing essentially the same thing. Libertarians like to focus on their support for gay marriage and legalized pot, which earns them a few pats on the head from liberals. But at the same time they downplay their positions on things like economics and employment discrimination, which would invoke liberal hostility. She’s right to call this cowardly. Drug legalization is certainly important, but so are free markets—and focusing on one and not the other is just a cheap way to court praise and avoid confrontation.

Joe Ptak’s recent string of posts on this blog represents a perfect example of the cloying conservative begging for praise.

Most recently, he tells us that conservatives must accept gay marriage, because, in his words, it isn’t as bad as “some radical left wing gay orgy.” Okaaay. They should also oppose the March for Life because—gasp!—it is “ideological.” And if they object to the massacre of peaceful Branch Davidians at Waco, well, then they’re just a bunch of “tin-foil hat wearing oddballs” who “ignore or deny the fluidity and tension of the temporal that is at the heart of a historical understanding of politics.” (I’ll admit I’ve heard the tin foil part before, but the second part . . . well, that’s a new one.) Rather than attacking the modern state, conservatives are also supposed to “touch the ‘why’ of power.” (I don’t know what that means, or even what a “why” feels like. I just know that touching one doesn’t seem overly important, especially if it takes away from real opportunities to delegitimize the state.)

Oh, and, beyond all that, conservatives should also vote for Barack Obama, because, hey, he decided not to build a Death Star.

Of course, though all of these positions are justified from an allegedly conservative perspective, they all reach conclusions that perfectly align with the Democratic Party platform.

In this kind of “conservatism,” the liberal is the one who makes history; the conservative just lives in it. So, if the world that the liberals made empowers the government to massacre peaceful separatist groups, so be it. Conservatives will just make sure the liberals don’t go too far. (Joe writes: “It’s our thing to keep the society from becoming overwhelmed by its baser instincts.”) But of course, with every successive change, the definition of “going too far” expands. Twenty years from now, we can expect Joe to support “radical left wing gay orgies” as being preferable to pedophiliac orgies.

Here, the liberal is the rock star who passes through town impregnating groupies and trashing hotel rooms. The conservative is the meek lawyer who stops by the next day to settle accounts and smooth over hard feelings. But never does the conservative question that preventing destruction in the first place is a worthy goal. Nor does he question the justice of a world that leaves only destruction in its wake.

No: “Theirs not to reason why/Theirs but to do and die.” After all, to call social destruction “unjust” would be radical or ideological or . . . something.

Maybe Michael Oakeshott or Peter Viereck would recognize this as conservatism, but—as Joe asked of the Waco massacre—why should we care? If your version of conservatism just so happens to justify everything the Left does, then what’s the point of even calling it “conservatism” at all? Does it really matter if you like Burke’s epistemology if you also vote for Barack Obama and make peace with the modern state? Why not just drop the pretense and call yourself a liberal?

It’s always respectable to stand up and fight for your principles. So conservatives should be willing to accept the Left’s ire if that’s what sticking to your principles leads to. But to constantly tailor your positions just to fit in with the popular kids—that’s just a middle school morality that should be totally rejected.

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Rand Paul’s Filibuster and the Separation of Powers

Senator Rand Paul held the floor of the Senate in a bid to prevent a vote on the nomination of John O. Brennan to be Central Intelligence Agency Director on Wednesday.

Frustrated by what he sees as the Obama administration’s refusal to answer a direct question- whether the administration claims the power to kill non-combatant American citizens on American soil- Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky took to the Senate floor at 11:47 AM Wednesday morning to stall the nomination of John Brennan for CIA director.

Regular readers will know that several of the contributors here at Beyond the GOP (including myself, Kelse Moen, and Radagast) have addressed the Obama administration’s drone policy as one of the most pressing contemporary constitutional issues. Even still, the true value of Senator Paul’s filibuster today does not so much lie in the fact that the use of drones is a bad policy as it does a reaffirmation of the constitutional system of checks and balances that holds the American constitutional order in place.

Senator Paul makes it very clear that his filibuster has little to do with the selection of Brennan as CIA director and everything to do with the legitimate role the Senate plays in limiting the power of the Executive Branch. ”This is not so much about Obama; this is not so much about John Brennan. This is about the rule of law,” declares Paul, approximately three and a half hours into his speech.

The Constitution makes it clear that the war-making powers of the President are subject to the oversight of the war-declaring and war-funding powers of the legislative branch. Whether or not Americans agree with the President’s drone policy, it is within the best interest of all Americans to have a Senate that will fiercely defend any intrusion on their express constitutional duty to give oversight to the Executive branch.

For far too long, Beltway insiders have done far too little to combat the growth of what Political Scientists have described for decades as the “Imperial Presidency”- that is, a Presidency that is no longer bound by the Constitution or by competing branches of government. Perhaps this time the Obama administration has gone too far. Perhaps this time, the self-declared “Checks and Balances Caucus” of Rand Paul (R-KY), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Mike Lee (R-UT), and Mark Udall (D-CO) will stand together in bipartisan support for civil liberties.

Personally, I doubt it. But one can still hope…

Categories: Checks and Balances, The Constitution, Tyranny | Tags: , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

The Gaypocalypse and the Conservative Cause

PRSanco has written a provocative post which gives to the conservative a pragmatic solution to the gay marriage debate that currently divides the country and causes conservatives to break out in cold sweats as they lie awake at night waiting for the gaypocalypse.

The problem is that this is not a new solution. Andrew Sullivan did it first. In 1989 he wrote a now seminal article arguing that conservatives should support gay marriage. From that time, conservatives have only stood against history, yelling their throats raw in an effort to defend “tradition” instead of becoming a guide of social and political change. So, while there is a debate, let’s not mistake that it is an academic one. Instead of pining for the old, why don’t conservatives get on with a justification for their existence, which is to conserve the social order? Conservatives can’t do that if they’re scaring the crap out of us in an effort to warn us of the great Gaypocalyse. We get it. The world is changing. Traditional marriage is coming to an end. If we accept gay marriage we are spelling the end of traditional marriage by fundamentally rejecting the definition that has undergirded Judeo-Christian culture for thousands of years. Now do your thing and guide the change so that it doesn’t devolve into some radical left wing gay orgy (literally). It’s what we’re supposed to do. It’s our thing to keep the society from becoming overwhelmed by its baser instincts. Yet we’re not doing that. We’re too busy telling the world about how society is succumbing to the democratic whims of its lesser selves. Way to drop the balls, guys.

Categories: Cultural development, Cultural renewal, Ideology, Localism, Traditionalism, Uncategorized | 3 Comments

Waco, The Modern State and the Why of Power

Ben has written a very insightful post which problematizes the norm of the use of state power against religious minority sects in way that encourages the deeper exploration of this matter both as a theoretical and empirical problem. That being said, I don’t feel like agreeing with what Ben writes.

The first question I have to ask is: does anyone really care about the massacre at Waco? Don’t misunderstand me, it was a tragedy. But, it was a tragedy that occurred 20 years ago. As an exemplar of the voracious appetite of the state, it’s not so unique. And conservatives have been warning of the statist apocalypse for a while. In any or none of the following figures and laws on this arbitrary and woefully incomplete list may be found the conservative root of all statist evil

I hope that the few people reading this list can sympathize with the difficulty I have when I attempt to determine an adequate causal pattern to explain the rise of the state. When reading typical anti-statist literature, I just can’t figure out a time when the modern state was not present. If encroachment and centralization are the names of this game, then the modern state has been around in various iterations for a long time. So, the fun of variations on a theme notwithstanding, this makes for perplexingly selective history and even more baffling and unhelpful analysis.

The second question I have is: did Ben and I read the same article? Ben’s blame-the-big-state trope is undermined by the Jenkin’s article from which he extensively excerpts: it was not the big state as such which is to be pointed to as the cause, but rather the linkage of “separatist compounds” with violent and extremist political movements that helped to make the raid possible. That is excised from the excerpt Ben uses to support his argument in his post. I don’t quite get the logic of Ben’s analysis at the point that we’re excluding from discussion this seemingly central perceptual frame which played so important a causal role in the tragedy. Jenkins himself writes in his piece that these patterns of relationships that preceded the Waco siege contributed to the perception of the Branch Davidians as being more of the same – and the behavior of the Branch Davidians simple confirmed for the feds their belief about the group in a tragic example of feedback.

Ultimately, what Ben has done is to refute the traditionalist dictum of history, instead to be in favor of an ideologically appealing and comparatively thin abstract explanation which ignores or denies the fluidity and tension of the temporal that is at the heart of a historical understanding of politics.

And that is a problem for conservatism. If conservatives want to produce work that is read, that is thought about and that is engaged, then we’re going to have to do a better job than the empirically thin, theoretically vague and maddeningly irrelevant material of mass produced replications of a theme that conservatives have not moved away from since conservatives started complaining about how much the world is changing.

Seriously, we’ve been writing about the demise of community and the ascent of the state for years now (even before Russell Kirk). Waco is just another confirmation of this pattern that I can’t help but begin to think is the norm – which makes us look like tinfoil hat wearing oddballs. We’re busy trying to chronicle and explain something that really isn’t all that abnormal, finding causal, phenomenal or rhetorical significance in events – like Waco – while ignoring the events, effects, and patterns that can produce some neat insights into a social phenomena (like state power) and contribute to our cumulative knowledge of it. We conservatives need to think of some new stuff to say, instead of pimping out themes that were battered and chapped even thirty years ago. But here we are… new puzzle, new problem, same answer. And we still haven’t bothered to touch the “why” of this power. Sure, we theorize about it. But the theory is stale. We need some new stuff. For a class of people who prides ourselves on being historically acute and astute, we’re not living up to our claim.

While Ben’s post is an interesting meditation on the nature, structure and behavior of the modern state, it’s reliance on the Waco example – or, Jenkin’s on Waco – obscures more than it illuminates. It’s heavy theory and light fact produce an interesting, albeit confusing and ultimately dissatisfying, thought experiment.

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The Immortal Murray Rothbard

Murray Rothbard would have been 87 tomorrow. He has been dead for 18 years, and yet he is more popular and more widely-read now than he ever was in life, especially among the young.

Paul Lyons, a radically leftist historian who chronicled his experience teaching a class on American conservatism, had this to say about Rothbard:

[W]e began a lively, focused discussion . . . about the different takes on libertarianism by Frank Meyer and Murray Rothbard. Rothbard’s principled libertarianism, castigated as libertine by Meyer, is attractive to many of my students, including some of the liberals, because his style is modest and direct and his argument seems consistent—any state intervention is coercive, from taxation to the military draft, from censorship to drug laws. Meyer, on the other hand, argues that liberty must be a means but not an end, that it must serve the good, the quest for virtue. Rothbard unashamedly counters that libertarianism isn’t concerned with “what a person does with his or her life,” which he sees as “vital and important but . . . simply irrelevant to libertarianism.” The class came alive in our discussion of Rothbard’s notion that given the mix of good and evil in all humans, that with limited government [sic?---Rothbard was an anarchist and viewed "limited government" as an impossibility] “bad men can do least harm.” (Emphases added.)

When I first graduated from college, I worked for a while at the Leadership Institute, and spent my time helping out libertarian and conservative college activists in Georgia and South Carolina. College-age libertarians, whether citified Atlanta hipsters or rural, traditionalist, paleos, would always light up whenever I mentioned Rothbard. I spent many hours discussing and debating his brand of pure, untarnished libertarianism.

But though more people read Rothbard than ever before, this popularity is not itself surprising. As Justin Raimondo writes:

Young people were drawn to Rothbard, and he received them gladly, generously ladling out great dollops of his time and hospitality while still managing a rate of high-quality literary output that would be hard to beat. The reason for this magnetism was, first of all, his passion, and not only for justice but for good conversation, good laughs, good food, and a good time. Exuberant, vociferous, his laughter easily heard above the din, Rothbard was welcomed by the young because he was, in at least one important sense, one of them. Like Lord Acton, Rothbard grew more radical as he grew older, and this, combined with his intractably bourgeois tastes and mode of living, so distinctly old culture, charmed the young. He appealed to the best in them: to their idealism, their fearlessness, and their sense of life’s unlimited possibilities. Rothbard was a man who knew what Bourne touted as the “secret of life,” which is “that this fine youthful spirit shall never be lost. Out of the turbulences of youth should come this fine precipitate—a sane, strong, aggressive spirit of daring and doing. . . . To keep one’s reactions warm and true is to have found the secret of perpetual youth, and perpetual youth is salvation.” (Emphases added.)

May his spirit live on and his ideas never die!

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Bridging the Gap on the Same-Sex Marriage Debate

I just read a book review on the American Conservative Magazine website. The book written in four hands (Maggie Gallagher and John Corvino) is entitled “Debating Same-Sex Marriage”. According to the review, their point is not to get in agreement, but to show the differences between their positions. Although they are exercising an important role in this debate, that happens worldwide, not only in America (even in my beloved Brazil, but we can talk about what is happening there later), the premise that there is no common ground from which one could start to negotiate a solution is striking. If there is no possibility of accommodation, the only way to solve the problem is to impose a position over others, which is not socially healthy. Based on the review, I will try to find a common ground from where both sides can meet and negotiate a solution.

First of all, I need to say that I agree with Gallagher: “Marriage is intrinsically a sexual union of husband and wife, because these are the only unions that can make new life and connect those children in love to their co-creators, their mother and their father.” The very idea of marriage is linked to procreation and family, and that is prior to law. The law of marriage comes from such recognition, it does not give it. Although I do not know if she states this in the book, marriage where the couple has no interest in becoming a family is a “marriage” in name only, which is the same to say that is no marriage at all; and, that is valid even for couples formed by people of different genders. Therefore, the concept of “marriage” goes beyond the “one male + one female” statement. I would never honk for that. Please, do not insist.

Well, this puts me in an awkward position. After all, I am stating that a considerable amount of marriages out there are, or at least should be, not marriages, even if between men and women. But if not, what are they, after all? Relationships that have no interest in procreation, they are SOMETHING, and this is undeniable. The current law of the United States even considers some of them to be marriages, which shows there is a social interest in such recognition. But the law only recognizes marriages in cases of unions between men and women, even if there is no intention of the couple in having children. This brings the question: what is the difference between such relationships and those between people of the same sex?

Andre Archie gives a hint of the answer in his review: “If marriage refers to a natural kind that consists of a mother and a father, and it is not created by law because it is prior to law, why does the law regulate marriage? Because civic order, according to Gallagher, has a stake in regulating the sexual behavior of men and women for the purpose of ensuring that children are raised by married mothers and fathers in a context that provides a sense of familial permanence, monogamy, and fidelity.” As I will show, according to this quote, the answer to the question above would be “none”.

Although I would again agree with Gallagher here, I believe she falls short on the matter. I believe civic order has a stake that goes beyond that. This is easily noticed since no married couple is obliged to have kids, in the first place. So if you take away the children part of her statement, what remains? Monogamy and fidelity. That is where Corvino’s position on the book comes in. He touches an interesting problem: there are people that want the recognition of their relationship with people of the same sex the same way law already does with people of opposite sex but has no interest in becoming a family.

This is clear in Corvino’s definition of marriage, one with which I disagree. For him, marriage is a “couple’s commitment to each other and to society that they are each other’s main line of defense in the world, for life. It [marriage] is an exclusive commitment, not in the sense a spouse doesn’t care for other people (children, friends, parents), but in the sense that only one person can be your Number One Person.” This definition works perfectly for marriages that already are recognized as such, where there are no children involved. But, I agree with Gallagher that marriage and family are inseperable.
However, and here it is what I want to stress, there is a point that Corvino makes that is already in Gallagher’s position: one can identify a bond with someone else (monogamy) that is expected to endure (fidelity). Monogamy and fidelity, therefore, are the common ground where an agreement between both parties is possible. People can get together and share a home for different reasons, and those reasons are enough to the recognition of the validity of such relationships. They are not marriage, because Gallagher is right, but they are very close related to it, as Corvino shows. There is an undeniable resemblance between them. They are all sexually based: there is a mutual sexual interest on them; and they are friendly based: there is a mutual trust and care on them. And if those are enough for the law to establish the validity of such relationships when they are made between men and women, there is no reason to treat differently others just because they are made between men or between women.

This is an actual social and political problem that needs to be addressed. The challenge here is: how to protect “marriage” while, at the same time, recognize the union of people that cannot, or do not want to, become families [the question of adoption notwithstanding; let’s not go so far]? The only solution I could find, and it has its own problems, I admit, is the complete separation of “marriage” and “civil union”. Law, that is, statutes made by governments, can only regulate what “civil unions” are because they have interest in that. Marriage, on the other hand, should be a RELIGIOUS matter, sacred as it is. In such a case, all marriages would be civil unions, but the contrary would not be true.

Politically, I would defend that civil unions should remain monogamic, and that divorce should be a very difficult thing to obtain, because they should be as close to marriage as possible, although I know that the former is easier to get support for than the latter. Hence, my position on the matter is in favor of changing the law to subtract the word “marriage” altogether. Use “civil union” instead, and give same-sex couples the same rights [adoption being another matter] of different-sex couples. This way, I believe the gap between Gallagher and Corvino can be bridged. The notion of marriage being sacred, an essential part of family and related to the perpetuation of the species is preserved, and, at the same time, the interest of those that do not want to start a family but still want to share their lives with someone else is attended.

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The Waco Massacre and the Modern State

Waco tanks

The Wall Street Journal has published a very provocative piece by Philip Jenkins on the federal government’s 1993 massacre of the Branch Davidians, a fringe religious sect in Waco, Texas. This Thursday marks 20 years since the initial attack by ATF agents that would lead to 50-day siege by the FBI and, ultimately, leave 80 sect members, including 20 children, dead.

What makes Jenkins’ article unique is that he emphasizes the extent to which Americans have historically allowed a high degree of toleration for fringe religious sects, a toleration that has become endangered by the consolidation of all political power into the hands of the centralized American state:

Though some religious groups (most notably the Mormons) have occasionally faced violent opposition, Americans have proved remarkably tolerant of religious separatists. If people who believe in imminent apocalypse feel the need to flee the wrath to come and seek refuge in the wilderness, why shouldn’t they?

Only gradually, in the 20th century, did the state begin to encroach, as military conscription during World War I and the welfare state made it impossible for sects to maintain complete isolation.

….

The outcome of the Waco siege left people stunned by the sheer amount of bloodshed. But the broad popular hostility to Waco also suggests that Americans generally do respect the rights of believers to follow their own paths, however far removed from mainstream.

Over time, though, those rights have in practice been limited by the state’s growth. If America’s religious frontier is not exactly closed, then it is far more constrained than it ever has been.

Why exactly the centralization of power should lead to the targeting of minority groups within society is an interesting question. On the one hand, the national government has often grown in strength while attempting to protect certain favored minority groups from discrimination: a very worthy goal, in most cases. But to the extent that it has done so, it has also introduced a minimum level of mandatory national conformity to which all groups- even fringe religious sects in out-of-the-way places- are held.

What makes the modern state different from every previously existent social-political association is that it reserves to itself a total, unquestionable authority to enforce its will. This absolute authority is equally threatened by the leader of a fringe sect as it is by a discriminatory employer. Both of these individuals, to the extent that they disconfirm the illusion of national conformity and challenge the authority of the state,  pose an existential threat to the state, and thus neither can be tolerated.

And herein lies the danger of relying on the power of the centralized state to protect minority rights: the moment at which a minority ceases to be in danger of extinction and instead begins to try, however meekly, to assert some degree of self-determination, it becomes an enemy of the centralized state.

The great conservative sociologist Robert Nisbet provides one of the best articulations of this phenomenon in his timeless book The Quest for Community:

The State becomes powerful not by virtue of what it takes from the individual but by virtue of what it takes from the spiritual and social associations which compete with it for men’s devotions.

….

The absolute political community, centralized and omnicompetent, founded upon the atomized masses, must ceaselessly destroy all those autonomies and immunities that are in normal society the indispensable sources of the capacity for freedom and organization.

————–
Fortunately, as Jenkins’ article reminds us, Americans are still naturally suspicious of attempts to curb the power of fringe groups within society. As long as this remains the case, there will continue to be a remarkable degree of toleration for those challenging the supremacy of the state. But the federal slaughter of the Branch Davidians in 1993, like the assault on the Weaver family at Ruby Ridge in 1992, serves as a reminder that the state’s desire for power, supreme and uncontended, remains unsated.
Categories: Localism, Religious Liberty, Secession, Tyranny | Tags: , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

The Philosophers and the Conservatives

Alexander Rosenberg and Daniel Little have written excellent books which introduce to the student of the social sciences the many different philosophical problems that the student will implicitly explicitly confront in his progress towards his mastery of the discipline(s). While both books provide excellent and overlapping overviews of the major philosophical dilemmas that are inherent to the social scientific enterprise, the Little book has one feature that elevates it above Rosenberg’s effort: examples. While Rosenberg’s book provides a philosophically rich discussion of the themes and arguments in the philosophy of social science – whose questions and answers have significant implications for the design, execution and expectations of the practice(s) of the social sciences, his book lacks the kind of (con)textual references which would appeal to the student or practitioner of the social sciences who would like to know how topics and perspectives on matters such as causality; cultural and moral relativism; the other sciences; or, Marx and Freud, have to do with them.

Little comes through where Rosenberg lags. Whereas after reading Philosophy of Social Science, the reader (whether or not he is a student of the social sciences) may be left wondering how the themes discussed in the chapters are relevant to what is placed on the average political science syllabus, journal article or book, very early on and consistently in Varieties of Social Explanation, the reader is made aware of the implicit and explicit relationships between the philosophical themes under consideration and the nuts-and-bolts work that comprises social science. Each chapter of the book contains within it any number of separate and brief boxes highlighting social scientific research, which provides concrete examples of topics of study in order to connect the abstract philosophy of social science with the concrete reality of social science practice.

I recommend both books to any student of political science, political theory or other social science disciplines. In particular, I think the political theorists would have a lot to say in response to the philosophical topics dealt with in the philosophy of social science. The bloggers and readers of beyondthegop.com would, I think, have many opinions – some strong, others weak – on the philosophical matters that social scientists and social science confront. On whether or not human behavior is rational; whether or not human behavior is best understood as a product of the structure or function of a particular social system; whether or not there are universals in human cultures or whether or not there are incommensurable differences in beliefs, morals and/or cultures; whether or not a science of human behavior is either possible or desirable; and, how the answers to these and other questions affect our study of human behavior. All of this is taken under consideration in both of the books.

 

So what is a conservative to say to the person who wants to be a social scientist? I think that the answer depends on the conservative. I say this to, I suppose surreptitiously, point out that conservatism per se really has nothing to say to the study of human behavior. After all, conservatism claims to be the anti-system. Anti-ideology, anti-rationalism (enlightenment), anti-change, anti-dreams, fantasies and fancies. The does not leave much for conservatism to say to a person who wants to systematically study and produce conclusions about the social world. Conservatism is not Marxism (some of whom, working in that tradition, have produced some interesting stuff).

I don’t think that conservatives should be looking to conservatism in order to find any guiding wisdom for the study of the social world. The conservative – traditionalist, neo, paleo, christian, etc. – should realize that the self-acknowledged limitations of conservatism imply that the conservative has to search elsewhere if (s)he wants to actually make conservatism matter. Decouple and unpack the assumptions that the individual traditionalist has about the world and then come back to conservatism after the traditionalist has a slightly better understanding of the relationship between his view of the world that is independent from the conservatism that is supposed to be its source. Is it at this level where I think that the conservative theorist can meet the philosophy of social science.

After that meeting, when the conservative has engaged the topics, then return to conservatism with a better understanding of the philosophical issues at risk and then improve upon the presentation of conservatism. Philosophy of social science has the potential to give a great deal to conservatism. I hope that the conservatives will be willing to dialog with it.

Categories: Cultural renewal, Ideology, Libertarianism, Traditionalism, Uncategorized | Tags: , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Human Rights: True and False

At the American Conservative, Paul Gottfried takes on “human rights” talk. He writes:

I am arguing against the use of human rights bombast whenever some individual, institution, or state wishes to express a political preference or a program of social reconstruction. Just make your arguments and let the listener decide. Further, I don’t object to listening to moral arguments against societies that do horrible things. Mention what the leaders of these societies do and then leave it to others to decide whether your indictment is correct. Saying that what you deplore violates human rights fills space with noise without contributing anything substantive to human knowledge. . . .

There are sharp and even growing differences in our society about fundamental behavioral questions, and appeals to supposedly universal rights language will not likely heal these divisions. Significantly, both those who favor and those who oppose the right to abort a fetus shower us equally with human-rights rhetoric. That practice settles nothing of importance, except for allowing the speakers to feel good about their cause and about themselves for upholding it.

I’m inclined to agree. “Human rights” (and “natural rights” more generally) have become what Ayn Rand would call anti-concepts; they are attempts to win people over by ill-defined and contentless appeals to emotion.

Here at Cornell, for instance, we get bombarded with a litany of human rights appeals. But it is hard to figure out what a “human right” actually means—unless “human rights” are just whatever the left-wing zeitgeist decrees, which, in all honesty, they probably are.

Thus, there is no absolute right to property, but there is a right to “dignity” (whatever that is). There’s a right to a minimum wage, but no right to work below that wage if you’re willing. There’s a right to smoke pot, but probably not to snort cocaine, and definitely not to own a gun, though yes to owning a knife . . . probably. In constitutional law, you have no right to grow wheat above government-specified allotments but you have the absolute right to be free from non-sectarian high school graduation prayers. Of course, abortion and gay marriage are clear human rights. What you do with your own body is nobody’s business but your own, unless you’re using your body to eat food, drink soda, smoke cigarettes, or to not insure your own health. None of those are rights, silly; they can all be regulated. All nations have an absolute right to self-determination and to form their own governments—unless you live in the American South, in which case even suggesting this right makes you are a dangerous extremist. If, like the Libyans or the Iraqis, you have a government that isn’t human-rightsy enough, then the UN has the right to authorize an invasion to replace it with one better suited to human rights. And if you don’t know what “better suited to human rights” means, please read this paragraph all over again. Clear enough now?

Of course, the people who believe this stuff have their own rationalizations for it. Around law school you hear that “economic” rights are unimportant and therefore properly regulable, whereas “social” or “dignitary” rights go to the essence of a person’s being and can never be justly infringed upon. In other words: whether you’re able to earn a living at the profession of your choice is just an “economic” right undeserving of real protection, so the government can put up as many regulatory obstacles to it as it wants. But when it comes to sodomy, the slightest infringement would undermine your very personhood. This befuddles those of us who ever venture outside the campus grounds. After all, “what do you do for a living?” is one of the most common questions that people hear each day. Questions about sodomy . . . not so much. How does sodomy impact your personhood in a way that your job doesn’t?

Professor Gottfried is therefore right to call out “human rights” for the self-serving nonsense it is. Unfortunately, however, the point is lost on many libertarians, just as it is on leftists. The comments on Gottfried’s article are filled with hyperbolic libertarian claims to that effect. Many cite the Declaration of Independence—these rights are inalienable, and that’s that.

But if “human rights talk” is sloppy thinking when leftists do it, then it is sloppy thinking when we do it too. Just stating that you have a God-given right to life, liberty, and property doesn’t make it so. We need to be prepared to ask “why?” and to come up with a justification for why life, liberty, and property are rights worth protecting.

If we do that, I think we will find that rights come about because they satisfy some higher end. They are social contrivances—tools to make life better.

In other words, if people value life and happiness, then they will need to find some social structure that furthers those goals. Because all worldly goods are scarce, people need to find some way to divide up ownership to them. Because people live and flourish better when property is secure, we want to protect their property against invasion. We say that the first person to find a piece of unowned property and put it to use becomes its owner, and that thereafter any trading with the property must be founded on every affected person’s consent, because to say otherwise would be to introduce strife and violence into society. And on and on—the nature of reality determines the necessary social structure.

But that doesn’t mean that rights can be changed at will. Even though they’re instrumental, they all depend on external realities, like the existence of economic scarcity, that are fixed and unchanging, and that we can expect to last as long as the universe itself. Theft (or taxation) will always be bad, because it violates these prerequisites for social life and peace.

Something like this is what Randy Barnett meant when he spoke of natural law theory and utilitarianism existing in “creative tension” within libertarian thought. Indeed, the first chapter of Barnett’s The Structure of Liberty presents what I consider to be one of the best formulations of natural law theory that I’ve read, mainly because it grounds it in practical reality with an eye always to promoting beneficial outcomes. It is no surprise, then, that Henry Hazlitt’s The Foundations of Morality comes from a utilitarian (or, as Hazlitt would say, “utilist”) perspective, but ends up justifying the same kinds of rights that Barnett and I support. I’ve also recently discovered the Aristotelian Henry Veatch, who similarly grounded natural law in a highly practical “practice of living.” And of course, there’s Murray Rothbard. Rothbard is often portrayed as the kind of purely abstract, “do right though the heavens may fall” kind of guy. But his historical and economic writings, as well as his essays on current events, show that he had a deep understanding of how his theories played out in the real world. Indeed, in Egalitarianism as a Revolt against Nature, he specifically writes that if something “does not work in practice, then it is a bad theory.” He had nothing in common with the people who just toss the label “human right” onto anything that sounds nice.

The nuances of Barnett, Hazlitt, Veatch, and even Rothbard are not appreciated by lots of modern libertarians. Of course, we can’t expect a mass movement to read a lot of dry philosophy. But to the extent that we want to bring people into libertarian philosophy, it is probably much easier to convince them that libertarianism would leave society better off than it is to convince them that any other theory violates the “rights of man.”

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The Sip that Rocked the World

I didn’t watch the State of the Union last night. When I’m in the mood to watch a show about nothing, I just watch reruns of Seinfeld. But apparently a lot of people did watch it, because, when I logged into Facebook today, everyone was abuzz.

Abuzz about what? The president’s escalation of deadly drone strikes? The continued politicization of Sandy Hook as a pretext for more gun control? Questions about when the “mess that Obama inherited” will ever end?

If you think so, then you’ve never met the kinds of people who obsessively follow politics. For most of these people, politics is an all-consuming hobby or a career path, not an opportunity to worry about important moral questions.

So, the buzz focused on something quite different. That is: it turns out that Marco Rubio took a sip of water during his reply speech.

The news was important enough that Politico still kept as its headline well into the evening today.

Politico Rubio

The linked article begins:

Sen. Marco Rubio’s inopportune case of cotton mouth during his State of the Union response may slow his rapidly rising stock, but will likely have no little [sic?] lingering impact on his 2016 prospects, Republican operatives said Wednesday.

Well, that must be a relief for Rubio. According to one of the best-trafficked political websites, the fact that he took a sip of water during a yesterday’s speech should not impact a presidential race 3 years from now. Genius! With analysis like that, I could be writing for Politico, and would be reaching a much wider audience than I do right now.

In case you need more analysis, see also the Atlantic‘s article, “Marco Rubio’s Awkward Drink of Water: A Deconstruction.”

This seems like the time to mention how low the news media have actually fallen. But what’s the point? The Atlantic and Politico are only focusing on what their readers care about. And the fact that this is what their readers are focusing on—on Facebook and elsewhere—tells us all too much about modern political culture.

 

Categories: Uncategorized | Tags: , , | 1 Comment

Il Papa

Il Papa

Learning this morning that Pope Benedict is stepping down, the first to do so in nearly 600 years, made my heart heavy. I really loved this Pope, and I wish that I had had the time to know him more. I was a little too young to know JPII, but Benedict was MY Pope.

Reactions so far have been somewhat uncharitable. The man is very old, and he stood by JPII for years as that great man’s health deteriorated. He must know some of the dangers, sorrows, and difficulties of becoming incapacitated while still Pope.

I was in Toronto for World Youth Day in 2002. That was still three years before JPII’s death, but even then he was suffering tremendously and his health was very low. It was hard to understand him when he spoke. Perhaps Pope Benedict knows better than us all what it means to deteriorate while Bishop of Rome. Though saddened, I am ready to understand and trust that he does this not out of selfishness, as some have suggested, but knowing what is best for the Church.

God watch and keep him.

Categories: Uncategorized | Tags: , , , | 1 Comment

First They Came For The Serial-Killers…

Fugitive cop-killer Christopher Dorner has just become the first human target of an unmanned aerial drone, according to Express.

This news comes just days after a leaked Justice Department white paper laid out the Obama Administration’s legal arguments for using drones to target U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism. A response to the paper by Herbert Titus and William Olson was published in American Thinker and highlighted some of the more troubling aspects of the white paper, including the very real possibility that drones could be used on American soil.

According to the white paper, there are only three requirements to order a killing.  First, “an informed high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States.”  Second, capture is “infeasible.”  And third, the ” operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with the applicable law of war principles.”  Indeed, from the white paper, it is not clear why killings of U.S. citizens on American soil would be judged by a different standard.

The fact that these targeted killings have heretofore been conducted on the other side of the world might have allowed the Administration to shelter American voters from the true horror of what their government is unleashing. Having a drone strike on U.S. territory might change all of that. It doesn’t seem far-fetched to say that it would take extraordinary circumstances for American sensibilities to become accustomed to the presence of unmanned drones on American soil. Using them against a burly, Manifesto-writing, assault-weapon-wielding cop-killer would seem to be a perfect storm for those in the Obama Administration anxious to put a positive face on their drone program. The fact that Dorner’s string of killings comes in the wake of other highly-publicized mass shootings only makes the situation seem more desperate.

At this point, there is no way to tell what the long-term implications of drone use on U.S. soil will be. But if the media continues to hype up the recent surge in gun violence, it would be reasonable to expect to see more, not fewer, gunmen targeted by aerial drones. And at the end of the day it doesn’t matter whether those gunmen are ex-cops with personal grudges or part of an elaborate international conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government; American citizens are bound to get caught in the crossfire either way.

——————–

Addendum:

It should be clarified that the use of drones to find Christopher Dorner has been questioned by some sources and that the LAPD has yet to confirm their use. Furthermore, the official quoted in the Express article implied that drones were being used merely to locate, not kill, Dorner. To the extent that my initial post failed to bear out this distinction, apologies are due. Finally, if unmanned drones are used to find Dorner, it wouldn’t be the first time they were used against American citizens: local police used an unarmed drone in 2011 in a standoff against a North Dakota family accused of stealing cows. I’m not kidding. Unarmed drones have also been used along the Mexican border.

That being said, I believe there are several points made in the original article that are still valid:

1) The recently-leaked Justice Department memo laying out the legal arguments for using drones to assassinate U.S. citizens fails to rule out the use of drones on U.S. soil, implying that the Obama Administration sees no legal barrier to their use on U.S. soil, against U.S. citizens.

2) We might not see the first lethal drone strike on U.S. soil today or tomorrow, but I found it hard to believe that it will not come soon. Both the escalating use of unarmed drones domestically- as well as of armed drones overseas- point to them playing an increasing role in eliminating perceived threats both at home and abroad. On this point, I hope that I am proven wrong.

3) The use of drones- whether armed or unarmed- without judicial oversight and authorization is troublesome from a constitutional perspective, as well as from a privacy perspective. Article III of the Constitution lays out the legal basis for treason against the U.S. government. For the executive branch to claim the authority to ignore standard judicial proceedings and summarily execute citizens without a trial process represents a gross violation of the separation of powers.

4) While I reject the argument that the LAPD is bound by the Fourth Amendment ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures,” I am deeply troubled by the use of high-tech aerial spy machinery, used without judicial warrant or public oversight.

Categories: Uncategorized | 5 Comments

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